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 We present here a case study of an organization within the 
U.S. Navy that created a new organizational construct and perfor-
mance management system. We explore the issues faced by naval 
leaders as they attempt to use their performance information to 
make resource allocation decisions at the sub-organization level, 
and drive budgets at the organization and service (navy) level. We 
diagnose the practical problems a government organization en-
counters when implementing a performance management system, 
to include their influence on budgets, and make recommendations 
for public sector performance budgeting organizations. This case 
confirms challenges noted in the literature associated with perfor-
mance management and performance budgeting systems. We offer 




In a recent manuscript, Schick (2008, p. 2) states, 
“the literature and practices of performance budgeting 
have been too long on exhortation and too short on di-
agnosis”. We present here a diagnostic case of a per-
formance management system in the U.S. Navy, ex-
amined through the perspective of those exhortations. 




and the issues faced by naval leaders as they attempt to 
use their performance information to formulate budget 
requests and execute budgets. We diagnose many of the 
practical problems a government organization encoun-
ters in designing and using a performance management 
system, especially when it seeks to extend the system to 
performance budgeting. In so doing, we provide empiri-
cal evidence of many of the findings in the literature, 
contribute to the understanding of how a performance-
based management system directs managers, and how 
such a system can (or cannot) be used to implement a 
performance-based budgeting system. 
 
We examine the surface warfare enterprise (SWE), 
an organizational construct that is part of a larger “Navy 
Enterprise” initiative.1 Broadly, the SWE is a construct 
that seeks to link various organizations involved in poli-
cy decisions and implementation of policy, including 
defining needs for and constructing, operating, and em-
ploying naval surface ships. We concentrate on the Na-
val Surface Force and its role in manning, training, 
equipping, and sustaining the existing surface fleet of 
162 ships. The ultimate outcome for navy ships is how 
they perform if and when they execute a mission for the 
nation. SWE leaders focus on preparing individual ships 
for these potential missions. For the SWE, the final 
measure of performance is a “warship ready for task-
ing” across multiple possible missions, an output with a 
quality measure (Robinson, 2007, p. 28; Hatry, 2001). 
The SWE designed its performance management system 
to support the process of making ships ready and it is 
the expectation of Navy leaders (which we refute) that 
the system can also drive the budgeting process.2 
                                                 
1 The leadership behind the initiative seeks to improve the cost-
effectiveness of implementing the nation’s maritime strategy. See 
www.navyenterprise.navy.mil. 
2 Although Navy leaders express their desire to “drive” the budget-
ing process, we recognize that past information only informs the 
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While a component of a navy may seem like an un-
usual subject for a case study if one hopes to generalize 
findings, there are attributes of this case germane to 
many public organizations that struggle with perfor-
mance based management and budgeting. The surface 
force provides an outcome (readiness) that is difficult to 
define and measure like other societal goals such as 
justice or public health. It provides an outcome whose 
causal factors are not clearly understood, like crime or 
poverty. Work processes have both routine and non-
routine components conditioned by externalities. The 
SWE depends on the support and cooperation of other 
organizations to attain desired outcomes. Its functions 
and levels of resources are determined by political 
processes and not solely through rational management. 
Given the drive towards performance-based budgeting, 
this study is not only timely but of interest to practition-
ers and policymakers alike.  
 
In the next section, we review the performance 
management and performance budgeting literatures re-
levant to our case study. We then describe the SWE and 
explain the performance management system and how 
leaders measure ship readiness. In the fourth section, we 
examine in greater detail this case’s critical issues of 
performance measurement and cost. We explain some 
of the benefits and shortfalls of measuring readiness 
using the SWE’s chosen algorithms and resulting per-
formance indicators. We also discuss problems in ag-
gregating the measures to get at overall ship and SWE 
effectiveness. We then discuss how the SWE uses cost 
analysis, some of the difficulties in measuring costs of 
inputs used to generate readiness indicators and why 
that is problematic for budgeting. After that, we present 
our findings and results, grounded in the literatures, and 
make recommendations for the SWE. Finally, we con-
                                                                                            
budget process; that is, past performance does not dictate future 




clude and make recommendations for public organiza-
tions who seek to use performance systems to inform 
management and budgeting. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
We derive our diagnostic framework from both the 
performance management and the performance 
budgeting literatures as those literatures apply to public 
sector, service-oriented organizations. 
 
1. Performance Management 
 
Robinson (2007, p. xxvi) defines performance 
management as the broad and systemic use of formal 
information to improve public sector performance, 
especially in the areas of human resource management, 
strategic planning and budgeting. Program budgeting is 
a mechanism for using performance information to 
influence priorities in resource allocation decisions 
(Robinson, 2007, p. 48). The U.S. military uses a 
program budget that classifies transactions into 
activities and programs. These activities and programs 
relate to and implement policy objectives. Ideally, lead-
ers assess those activities and programs and measure 
their performance against objective criteria. With 
respect to specific activities and programs conducted by 
an organization, performance management systems 
measure and evaluate inputs to activities, or work to 
outputs (efficiency), and outputs to outcomes (effec-
tiveness).3 
 
Frumpkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) and Robinson 
(2007), among others, note that government organiza-
tions have the least direct control over inputs and the 
least precise indicator of outputs of any type of organi-
zation. Performance management is often hampered by 
                                                 
3 We use “efficiency” and “effectiveness” as the public administra-
tion literature does. See, for example, HM Treasury (2001). 
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the lack of control of the quality and quantity of some 
inputs and the difficulty in finding appropriate output 
measures. Ambiguous causal relationships, environmen-
tal contingencies, and lag times contribute to the uncer-
tain link between the production of outputs and attain-
ment of outcomes (Havens H., 1983; Heinrich, 2004). 
In the case of the provision of public services, good 
outcome measures are problematic. Keeney and 
Gregory (2005) state that measures of objectives should 
be unambiguous, comprehensive, direct, operational, 
and understandable. Grizzle (1985) provides a 
consistent list of desirable attributes in her work on 
performance budgeting.  
 
When attempting to bridge from performance 
management to performance budgeting, cost per unit of 
something (input, activity, output or outcome) is a 
primary consideration. Generally, activity-based costing 
uses input budget data (costs) to connect specific activi-
ties to outputs to support management decisions 
(Brown, Myring, and Gard, 1999; Mullins and Zorn, 
1999; Williams and Melhuish, 1999). (Euske, Frause, 
Peck, Rosenstiel, and Schreck, 1999, p. 9) provide 
guidance on applying activity-based costing to service 
processes; they suggest tracking inputs and their 
resources relative to the output (service) the customer 
expects, “balancing that perspective with how to 
manage the service within the enterprise”. Such 
suggestions seem obvious in principle but are difficult 
in practice given the difficulty in defining outputs and, 
as the public budgeting literature shows, limitations of 
public spending data. Smith (2007) notes the specific 
difficulties in valuing national defense outcomes. 
 
2. Performance budgeting 
 
Robinson (2007, p. 1) suggests budgeting is the fi-
nancial component of performance management, broad-
ly referring to financial processes designed to “streng-




information in the performance management systems. 
Efficiency in performance budgeting has both an alloca-
tive component (results achieved through public ex-
penditures) and a technical one (the cost of achieving 
the results). He further notes that performance budget-
ing can take different forms depending on the goals of 
the organization: some use it to improve spending 
prioritization or to emphasize program technical 
efficiency; some use it to fund future expected results or 
strengthen the understanding of the link between past 
results and spending decisions in order to affect future 
budgets; some create managerial incentives and others 
do not; and some emphasize outputs where others 
emphasize outcomes (Robinson, 2007, p. 15).  
 
Havens (1983) notes the difficulty of integrating 
performance information into the budget process, spe-
cifically citing three impediments. First, offices that 
evaluate performance are often organizationally distinct 
from resource allocation offices. Second, the budget 
process and the evaluation process operate on different 
perceptions of time: budgeting is calendar-driven and 
evaluation is often event-driven. Third, budget analysts 
and program evaluators employ different analytical 
frameworks.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the U.S. federal 
government, many state governments and other coun-
tries use performance information in the management of 
programs and display the information in their budgets; 
however, there is little evidence that spending decisions 
are greatly influenced by the performance information 
(Schick, 2002; Melkers and Willoughby, 1998; Jordan 
and Hackbart, 1999; Congressional Budget Office, 
1993). Basing the budget on performance may be an 
unrealistic objective and performance information 
should only be expected to inform the budget process 
(Joyce, 1993; Schick, 2007). Flury and Schedler (2006) 
note the difficulties in serving both political and mana-
gerial needs with performance budget data. The produc-
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tion and processing of information by the various actors 
in the budget process are such that it is unrealistic to 
assume budgets can have a pure performance basis. 
 
Lu (1998) notes that performance budgeting has 
evolved from simple input and output measures to 
measures of efficiency and program effectiveness, but 
that the success of such systems hinges on the quality of 
measures (addressed above) and acceptance by deci-
sion-makers. Grizzle (1987) also notes that properly 
constructed incentives for managers and budgeters must 
be aligned with performance information. Sub-optimal 
behavior can result from mismanaging both actions and 
resources according to separate performance indicators, 
and sub-optimal behavior may occur at different levels 
of an organization. Managers may not want to be held 
accountable for outcome measures that have elements 
beyond their control. Organizational practices create 
incentives to manage performance, but disincentives to 
be accountable through the budget process – showing 
efficiencies currently takes funds away from efficient 
organizations (“use-it-or-lose-it” (Niskanen, 1971)) 
whether they are effective or not. Schick (2008, p. 8) so 
accurately comments:  
The ‘agency’ problem is especially acute on 
matters of performance, because adverse re-
sults can prejudice an entity’s budget. A re-
sourceful manager once explained his beha-
vior: ‘P[erformance] B[udgeting] requires me 
to load the gun that will be pointed at my 
head; as a manager, it is not hard for me to 
disarm the gun.’  
Furthermore McNab and Melese (2003, p. 77) note that 
the traditional government control budget exists primar-
ily to insure accountability and support appropriations 
processes, not to improve performance.  
 
Integrating these literatures, we developed the fol-
lowing graphical depiction of the components of and 




tem and a performance budgeting system (Candreva and 
Webb, 2008). The left side shows the budget authorities 
by appropriation or line item that purchase inputs 
which, through a set of activities, convert to outputs. 
The outputs then combine to produce intermediate or 
ultimate outcomes. The dotted line inside the figure 
represents the boundary of the performance manage-
ment system where managers concentrate on efficient 
production functions. The budgeting system operates 
outside the dotted box by validating the outputs and 
outcomes as a desired policy objective and by providing 
the budget authority to implement that policy. It is an 
open system, affected by the environment. Institutional, 
organizational, and bureaucratic routines, processes, 
incentives, and information systems (including financial 
accounting systems) affect the effectiveness of the sys-
tem. It is through this framework we diagnosed the case 
of the Surface Warfare Enterprise. 
 
Figure 1. 
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3. NAVY SURFACE FORCES AND PERFORM-
ANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
The Navy, like all the military departments, pro-
vides assets ready to deploy in defense of the country. It 
provides personnel and trains and equips these re-
sources, having them ready to support military opera-
tions conducted by the combatant commanders, key 
military leaders who manage a regional or functional 
area. Many organizations within the military services 
use performance management systems and attempt to 
inform the budget process using them; this paper focus-
es on a part of the shore component of the Navy, the 
one responsible for supporting ships. The shore compo-
nent is organized into three “type commands,” respon-
sible for the military readiness of specific types of as-
sets: aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. We focus 
our research on the surface force (SURFOR), under the 
command of a 3-star admiral, which currently supports 
the 162 surface ships of the U.S. Pacific and Atlantic 
Fleets.4 SURFOR manages approximately $5.2 billion 
in annual operation and maintenance funds for the 
readiness of the surface fleet. 
 
The Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) was estab-
lished in 2005 under the auspices of the Navy Enter-
prise initiative. The SWE is an organizational construct 
that seeks to integrate the efforts of the Navy headquar-
ters branch responsible for surface warfare policy (in-
cluding approval of budgets); the Naval Sea Systems 
Command, responsible for designing and building ships 
(approximately $9 billion annually in research and de-
velopment funds and ship construction funds); and the 
SURFOR, responsible for active ship readiness. As part 
of the SWE, SURFOR seeks to optimize warfighting 
readiness of the Navy’s surface fleet. Navy leaders be-
                                                 
4 Ships are based in San Diego; Pearl Harbor; Norfolk; Mayport, 
Fl.; Ingleside, Texas; Everett and Bremerton, Wash.; Bahrain; 




lieve continuous process improvement (technical effi-
ciency) in the core areas of maintenance, modernization, 
logistics, manning and training will create budget slack 
so the Navy can buy more ships, ammunition, and fuel 
(allocative efficiency). 
 
1. Matrix organization  
 
The SWE prompted SURFOR headquarters to 
reorganize along the lines of a matrix organization with 
functional and product line managers. Functional man-
agers mirror the performance management system based 
on five critical performance algorithms or “figures of 
merit.” These correspond to personnel, equipment, sup-
plies, training, and ordnance, or the acronym PESTO. 
Each functional manager oversees his respective 
PESTO area across all ship types. That is, there is a se-
nior officer in charge of personnel, another in charge of 
equipment maintenance, and so on, who manage those 
matters for all ships.  
 
Product line managers, on the other hand, are re-
sponsible for all PESTO areas for a given ship type. 
Called class squadrons (CLASSRONs) and led by an 
officer of equivalent military rank to the functional 
managers, they are responsible for the overall readiness 
of one of four types of ship: frigate, destroyer, cruiser 
and amphibious.5 Each class of ships has unique sys-
tems, requirements and capabilities. SURFOR must 
prepare individual ships according to the ship’s tech-
nology and expected mission requirements.  
 
To meet the Navy’s goal to project power anytime, 
anywhere, ships must be ready to function independent-
                                                 
5 We note here that CLASSRONs are a SURFOR organizational 
element used to manage the preparation of ships for deployment 
and do not replace the operational chain of command that includes 
similarly titled organizational elements, such as destroyer squa-
drons (DESRONs). 
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ly and interdependently, complemented by advanced 
technological reach from other assets. Thus, navy ships 
are first evaluated for mission readiness independently, 
which is the proxy for output, and the ships are eva-
luated again by the combatant commander (at some 
point) within the group of assets with which it deploys. 
This second evaluation is outside the scope of the 
SWE’s initial responsibility to provide a ready ship. The 
belief inherent in the system is that a properly trained 
and assessed individual ship will be capable of success-
fully integrating with others for all possible missions. 
Candreva and Webb (2008) created Figure 2 to show 
the matrix relationship among missions, ship type, and 
readiness indicators. 
 
Figure 2.  




Ship readiness is measured and reported in a fa-
shion that is consistent with the overarching Defense 
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), a defense-wide 
system for reporting military unit readiness for a given 
mission. Missions are comprised of discrete mission-




mission, for example, may be expected to perform tasks 
such as evading, detecting, tracking or engaging a sub-
marine. Functional managers evaluate the ability to per-
form each task according to the five performance indi-
cators (PESTO): sufficiently trained people, requisite 
equipment and weapons systems in proper working or-
der with sufficient logistics support.  
 
2. The SWE’s Performance Management and Budgeting 
Framework 
 
Figure 3, SWE Performance Framework, depicts 
the relationships among budget authority, inputs, out-
puts and outcomes for the surface navy (Candreva and 
Webb, 2008). Budget authority derives from various 
congressional appropriations justified by broad mission 
statements, detailed objects of expense (salaries, travel, 
utilities, supplies, rent), and longstanding performance 
measures that differ from the newer PESTO measures. 
The formal budget documents display input measures 
such as barrels of fuel and output measures such as un-
derway days per calendar quarter, but say little about 
mission readiness. Once received, the appropriations 
fund the various inputs to activities that generate readi-
ness as defined by PESTO, activities such as training, 
preventive or corrective maintenance, and operational 
exercises.  
 
The inside of the figure, shown by a dotted line, 
represents the performance management system, where 
managers concentrate on efficiencies measured by the 
PESTO figures of merit. On the right side of Figure 3, 
outcomes are ships ready for tasking for different mis-
sions. From the perspective of a combatant commander, 
who ultimately decides what assets to employ and 
whether the mission was effective, ready ships are an 
input. Indeed, an argument can be made that a ready 
ship is actually an intermediate outcome to the larger 
defense mission. In this study, we correlate PESTO in-
dicators to five proxy levels, each corresponding to the 
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quality of activities taken to measure ship readiness. 
Taken together and with human interpretation, they 
provide an overall picture of a particular ship’s availa-
bility to conduct a certain mission. 
 
Figure 3. SWE Performance Framework 
 
4. PESTO PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND 
COSTS 
 
1. Measuring an individual ship’s readiness using the 
PESTO indicators  
 
On the inside of Figure 3, PESTO algorithms at-
tempt to capture the relationships among the inputs, 
activities or processes, and outputs. Replacing the “me-
tric mania” (where the sheer number and disorganiza-
tion of metrics makes evaluating, comprehension and 
accountability problematic (Casey, Peck, Webb, and 
Quast, 2008), at the SURFOR leadership level, PESTO 
attempts to simplify performance measurement. PESTO 
indicators are proxies, standardized along a 0-100 scale, 
and assigned “green,” “blue,” “yellow” and “red” by 
scores of 90-100, 80-90, 70-80 and below 70, respec-




form a certain type of mission relative to the functional 
contribution (personnel, equipment, etc.) and is an out-
put measure negotiated within and agreed upon by SWE 
personnel. The maintenance performance indicator, for 
example, comes from an algorithm that assigns values 
to repair tasks weighted according to their impact on 
mission accomplishment. The personnel indicator cap-
tures both the quantity of sailors and their individual 
training and qualifications. Similarly, the training per-
formance indicator derives from an algorithm that cal-
culates the “right” training for the unit as a whole. Of 
the five performance algorithms, personnel, training, 
and maintenance are the most mature.  
 
To illustrate the complexity of tracking inputs to 
outputs, consider the relationship between the personnel 
(P) and training (T) elements of PESTO. Management 
of personnel primarily focuses on the inputs, processes 
and outcomes related to ensuring a sailor with the requi-
site skills fills a particular job. Managers use measures 
of “fit” and “fill” to assess performance: fill measures 
the number of sailors assigned to a ship and fit measures 
the professional characteristics of those sailors. If, for 
example, a ship requires and has in its crew four naviga-
tors and there are four critical navigation skills but the 
four navigators collectively are certified as competent in 
only three of the skills, the ship is 100% full, but only 
75% fit. Managers can correct this deficiency by train-
ing one of the sailors in the requisite skill or, in the 
course of the routine rotation of sailors to and from 
shipboard duty, identifying a sailor with the requisite 
skills to be the next assigned. Hence, one can see the 
interrelationship between the personnel management 
and training management functions. 
 
Training comprises two components: individual 
and ship-level training. Individual training may occur 
prior to a sailor’s arrival to the ship or it may occur once 
the sailor is part of the crew. The former is normally 
preferred because it increases the amount of time during 
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which the ship is ready to complete the various missions 
that sailor supports. If a sailor must leave the ship for 
training to become qualified in an area, her absence may 
reduce readiness in another area because each sailor 
supports multiple mission areas. Those who manage 
personnel and training readiness monitor the continuous 
process of sailor assignments, initial qualifications, gaps 
between current and desired states, and training events. 
 
It is not enough to populate a ship with sailors with 
requisite skills: the sailors must demonstrate the capa-
bility to work together, employing the ship’s technolo-
gy, in a manner that assures their ability to meet mission 
requirements. Thus, managers measure ship level train-
ing in terms of the percentage of mission areas a ship 
has been certified as able to perform, the time it takes a 
ship to complete the certification process, and the cost 
associated with the certification events. 
 
Taken together, these two functional areas provide 
other useful management information. For instance, 
navy leaders determined that a 90-95% fit measure is a 
reasonable level to expect given the system complexi-
ties of recruiting, training, assigning and retaining sai-
lors, but ships can generally perform well if they are 
manned at 103% fill. The few extra people adequately 
compensate for the missing skills. The system, however, 
is far from comprehensive. The training management 
system, for instance, is not adequately linked to the 
maintenance management system. Many maintenance 
tasks are event-driven (e.g., each time a gun is fired for 
training, several preventive maintenance tasks must be 
performed) but those maintenance costs are not part of 
the training cost computation. Further, the sailors’ sala-
ries are centrally managed by the Navy, not by the 
SWE, so the fit-fill trade-off is miscalculated and may 
lead to a suboptimal decision.  
 






Despite individual usefulness, we found that man-
agers cannot aggregate the PESTO performance indica-
tors to their goal of a single measure of “warships ready 
for tasking.” It is not reasonable to aggregate stoplight 
scores. In some instances, a “good” indicator (green or 
blue) does not insure a ship can perform a certain type 
of mission. For example, a ship tasked to perform a 
search and rescue mission could be “green” for training, 
equipment, ordnance and maintenance, and could have 
nearly all personnel ready to go, but could be missing 
the one requisite swimmer needed to perform the res-
cue. Despite appearing “green,” the ship cannot perform 
the mission and is not ready. The one missing item can 
cause the entire readiness indicator to be “redlined,” or 
dropped from a readiness status. By contrast, a ship 
might be at a lower-than-green level due to several mi-
nor problems that cause the algorithms to drop its 
scores, but is still be able to perform the mission. In 
another case, the commanding officer might feel ready 
to perform a certain type of mission because of an inno-
vative work-around, and thus judge his ship as “ready” 
in spite of the measure. Finally, the notion of ‘warships 
ready for tasking” begs the question, “ready for what 
tasking?” A fully capable warship may not be necessary 
or prudent; for example, a ship assigned to a humanita-
rian assistance mission need not be concerned with a 
degradation of anti-submarine warfare capabilities. 
While this is sometimes considered ex post (the ship 
that is not anti-submarine warfare ready becomes the 
one assigned to the humanitarian mission), cultural 
norms that favor full mission readiness at all times do 
not consider it ex ante. 
 
We find the PESTO scores are individually useful 
for directing action at the functional and product line 
management levels and for aggregating resources to be 
used at the margin (e.g., funding the highest priority 
maintenance repair – perhaps from a redlined ship – or 
sending a sailor to a training course). Separate perfor-
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mance indicators can result in sub-optimal behavior, 
though. The indicators defining a specific mission area 
for a ship type can meaningfully drive actions, but ag-
gregation across the third dimension is problematic. To 
get a clear understanding of overall “effectiveness” at 
the SWE level requires leaders to interpret the scores, 
reading written documentation supporting the scores, 
and asking questions when necessary. A clear under-
standing of effectiveness at the mission level – the ef-
fectiveness of the ship in performing the mission, is out 
of the scope of the SWE’s measurement system. How-
ever, leaders receive information that can be fed back 
into their system about strengths and weaknesses in 
their preparation of a specific ship for combat opera-
tions.  
 
Lastly, occasionally the SWE overrides the perfor-
mance information to drive specific organizational be-
havior. As a ship enters a maintenance period, repair 
tasks should be prioritized such that the equipment 
(maintenance) scores rise in the most critical mission 
areas. Occasionally, a particular ship modification or 
repair is considered a high priority but does not link to a 
specific mission area. One example given was the con-
version of a restroom on an all-male ship to accommo-
date the addition of female sailors. Because this task 
was mandatory it was assigned a PESTO score of 100, 
meaning the ship scored a zero until the conversion was 
complete. Doing so fundamentally changed the purpose 
of the performance management system from an evalua-
tion system to a control system (Behn, 2003) and 
masked the effects of all other repairs. 
 
3. Costs and Budgets 
 
Typical of many public sector performance budget-
ing attempts, the SWE has yet to make the leap from its 
longstanding encumbrance-based budgeting and ac-
counting systems to a system of cost accounting that 




tion (Pollitt, 2001; Berman and Wang, 2000; Evans and 
Bellamy, 1995). The challenge is not technological, but 
cultural. Despite rhetoric of cost-consciousness, the 
SWE’s primary financial concern is to obtain sufficient 
appropriations to operate and maintain the fleet at peak 
readiness and the secondary concern is to meet fiduciary 
responsibilities. The term “cost” is used synonymously 
with “obligation” even though there are important dif-
ferences. An obligation is recorded at the time a con-
tract is awarded or repair part requisitioned to meet the 
fiduciary responsibility of accounting for appropriated 
budget authority. It denotes that there is less budget 
remaining to spend, but it does not indicate the econom-
ic event normally associated with cost, the consumption 
of an input. That event often occurs much later. The 
prevailing belief in the SWE has been that the more one 
obligated, the more something cost; and, despite their 
stated intent, such beliefs drive analysis and information 
gathering today. 
 
The navy at large does not have a cost accounting 
system of the type managerial accountants in the private 
sector might expect to find in a large organization. The 
financial systems that exist support the appropriation-
based fiduciary responsibility of managers, and data are 
largely limited to obligations on objects of expense by 
organizational units within fiscal years. The navy does 
not well link financial data to processes or outputs, and 
non-financial information systems that support 
processes that consume financial resources are not de-
signed to provide adequate cost data. For example, 
maintenance systems manage repair activities and the 
obligation of funds for repair parts may be included, but 
not the costs of labor, indirect materials, and allocated 
overhead.  
 
We find five types of cost analysis in practice in the 
SWE. In the first type, analysts mine data to determine 
what is being purchased and to assess whether those 
purchases could be reduced. Such studies have shown 
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that grey paint is the single most frequently purchased 
item, which led the SWE to examine lower-cost alterna-
tives to traditional paint. Analysts have also shown par-
ticular repair parts are ordered more frequently than 
expected leading to cost-benefit analyses of re-
engineering the component. These analyses support 
idiosyncratic technical efficiency efforts, but do not 
support attempts to allocate efficiently. 
 
Secondly, spending by ships of the same class is 
compared based on homeport, or whether ships are as-
signed to the Atlantic or Pacific force. Such compari-
sons may yield information about differing regional 
maintenance or training practices, which can be helpful 
management information. Often, however, such com-
parisons lead to less productive discussions of fairness 
and equity in the distribution of resources. 
 
In the third type of cost analysis, the SWE has built 
a system of “bridgeplots” in navy parlance, or what 
might be called “dashboards.” Analysts chart cumula-
tive year-to-date spending against rolling averages of 
performance. The mismatched time scales are difficult 
to interpret and spending starts at zero at the start of a 
fiscal year. Managers who have historically cared more 
about managing appropriations than cost understand the 
spending plot; however, it is literally impossible to see 
the relationship between spending and performance 
measures.  
 
In the fourth type of cost analysis, the SWE uses 
the stoplight-coding schema for readiness indicators and 
attempts to compute the cost to move a ship from one 
(stoplight) status to the next. SWE leaders intend to 
allocate funds to gain maximum benefit in terms of rea-
diness. Two problems exist with this analysis. First, 
given the limitations of the accounting systems and 
knowledge of causal relationships, leaders have little 
confidence in the amount needed to move a ship from 




derstand costs, the stoplight system encourages subop-
timal decision-making, as resources tend to flow to the 
ships just below a threshold to give the appearance of 
progress, even if there are more important problems on 
other ships. 
 
Finally, analysts assign spending to missions in an 
attempt to understand or manage the cost of those mis-
sions. This is an admirable attempt to link cost to readi-
ness, but there are problems with the method. First, the 
mobility mission (the ability of the ship to simply move 
from one location to another) accounts for nearly half of 
the funds spent because of high fuel consumption. Mo-
bility missions include things such as propulsion and 
electricity generation, fundamental to all other missions. 
Thus, it should be viewed not as a “product center” but 
a “cost center” that provides basic services to other mis-
sions to which the mobility costs should be allocated on 
some logical basis. Second, as noted previously, the 
SWE considers a cost has been incurred when some-
thing is requisitioned, not when it is consumed and there 
can be significant lag times between the events. Parts 
may be consumed that were requisitioned years ago and 
just now taken off storeroom shelves. Third, two signif-
icant factors affecting readiness, the salaries of the sai-
lors on the ships and the original construction and capi-
tal improvements to ships, are not included in the 
SWE’s cost assignments because SURFOR does not 
control those funding lines. To the SURFOR, those 
costs are not relevant to the decisions they make and are 
ignored (Robinson, 2007, pp. 55-56); to the SWE, they 
are relevant, but are not yet systematically captured in 
the performance management or budgeting systems. 
This is not surprising for political, managerial, and 
technical reasons. Politically, control of financial re-
sources is a significant source of institutional power and 
managers share information reluctantly (Salancik, 
2003). Policy makers and managers make different 
types of decisions that rely on different types of infor-
mation (Flury and Schedler, 2006). Technically, public 
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sector accounting struggles with the notion of deprecia-
tion expenses and allocating the costs of fixed assets to 
products and services. Unlike the for-profit model 
where the matching principle of accounting states that 
all expenses must be matched to the revenue they gen-
erate and capital assets are assumed to generate revenue, 
links between revenue and capital expenditures in the 
public sector are normally confined to the realm of fi-
nancing. Government’s aim is not to generate revenue, 
it is to provide services, so both the logic and practice of 
accounting for capital assets is problematic (Chan, 
2003; GASB, 2006).  
 
While each of those forms of cost analysis yields 
some specific benefits, there has not been a systematic 
use of the analyses in the formal Navy budgeting 
process. Neither the process for budgeting for ship op-
erations nor the format and content of those budgets has 
changed appreciably. The performance management 
system operates within the CLASSRONs and SURFOR 
at locations geographically and organizationally re-
moved from the headquarters where budget allocation 
decisions are made. The SWE is just beginning to use 
these performance data as part of the justification for 
budget requests, but the use or acceptance of the data 
are not routine. SWE leaders find that the competition 
for resources has not fundamentally changed. In the 
end, budget allocations remain a political choice be-
tween desired policy outcomes and the existence of the 
performance data may lend a little more veracity to the 
requested sum, but it does not change the nature of the 
decision-making process. The SWE recognizes the need 





We find the SWE’s performance management sys-
tem is logical, detailed, comprehensive and reflects or-




While each critical performance measure or PESTO 
function is incorporated into the performance manage-
ment system through tasks and linked to mission areas, 
interrelationships among them are not well defined. 
Aggregation to a single measure of readiness across 
missions is not meaningful in this context. More de-
tailed performance data are meaningful and managerial-
ly useful; the organization uses the data to improve 
technical efficiency but in a manner that may sub op-
timize allocative efficiency. There is not a logical link 
between the creation of budget slack by improving a 
given process and an efficient allocation of that slack. 
The SWE has a system for the first, but not necessarily 
for the second. 
 
Institutional norms and overarching concerns about 
preserving, consuming, and expanding appropriations 
result in the use of inappropriate proxies for cost. Cost 
analysis, then, is compromised. It may result in technic-
al efficiency gains, but does not support the goal of al-
locative efficiency. Some vital resources used in pro-
ducing readiness come from outside the SWE, are 
funded in other organizations’ budgets, and are not con-
sidered in the performance management system. Occa-
sionally, managers co-opt the system to induce man-
agement behavior the system was not designed to in-
duce. Taken together, we find SWE managers have es-
tablished a system that produces useful managerial in-
formation about specific functions and tasks and that 
they are generally enthusiastic about the system because 
of its mission focus. We also find the system cannot 
measure efficiency of the full production function to get 
a ship ready and cannot support the budget process by 
providing a strong link between a level of funding and 
level of fleet readiness. We also observe a performance 
management system designed around the factors the 
SURFOR can control more than one designed to capture 
the full set of variables affecting fleet readiness. Sailor 
salaries and ship construction and modification costs are 
borne by other organizations from other appropriations 
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and are not factored into the cost of readiness. The cost 
of filling the ship to 103% manning levels is not cap-
tured, but does have implications for broader navy-wide 
budgeting. 
 
Consistent with the literature, the SWE has found it 
difficult to create a useful outcome measure, but has 
built a performance management system that provides 
detailed information about specific outputs. SWE lead-
ers would argue they have a single precise outcome 
measure (warships ready for tasking), but its utility is 
questionable. They would do well to abandon the idea 
of a single measure and accept that a handful of meas-
ures is more descriptive and provides more management 
information. For the most part, the SWE’s technical 
measures are unambiguous, direct, operational and un-
derstandable and they are well documented. Their cor-
responding financial measures are more ambiguous and 
less direct and should better correlate with the types of 
management decisions the SURFOR confronts. Appro-
priate cost data should be used when seeking to improve 
the efficiency of processes; obligation data should be 
used when deciding how to spend appropriated funds. 
Financial systems should be developed to generate both 
consistently.6 Further, the cost analyses do not often 
separate price effects from efficiency effects – the cost 
of an input, like paint, is often measured in dollars ra-
ther than gallons. Controlling for price variation is ne-
cessary in order to isolate and understand the amount of 
an input to a process. Currently, managers cannot use 
the system to fully assess how much of an apparent 
change in efficiency is due to changes in the price of 
                                                 
6 Many organizations combine planning, manufacturing, distribu-
tion, shipping, and accounting systems into an enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) system that integrates all of these functions into a 
single system. An ERP is designed to serve the needs of each dif-
ferent organization within the enterprise. An ERP is in develop-
ment and deployment in the U.S. Navy, but has not been deployed 
in the SWE and will not for some years. Thus, it was not part of the 




inputs, substitution of inputs, improvements in technol-
ogy, better training, or other productivity effect.  
 
Further complicating the connection between 
budgets and performance is that budgeting operates on a 
cyclical timeline while program performance is conti-
nuous. At any moment, four budget cycles occur simul-
taneously: one budget is being executed as the next is 
being enacted, a third is being formulated, and the re-
quirements for a fourth are under study. Even with ro-
bust accounting systems, establishing the link between 
readiness of the ships, the consumption of inputs that 
generated that readiness, and a specific year’s budget is 
empirically complex. What expenditures lead to a par-
ticular ship being ready for a particular mission? The 
spare parts in the ship’s storeroom may have been pur-
chased days or years ago. The training of the sailors 
may have occurred weeks or months ago. The collective 
experience of the captain and crew, not to mention the 
ship itself, may be two decades old. By extension, to 
which budget cycle (i.e., which fiscal year’s level of 
funding) does one ascribe a requirement for funds to 
purchase a set of inputs that will be used immediately, 
later, or perhaps never? The reality is that such deci-
sions are often made in order to consume expiring ap-
propriations or to meet another fiduciary threshold and 
not because the performance management system re-
commends it. 
 
As Havens (1983) notes, program analysts and 
budget analysts employ different analytical frameworks. 
The performance management system is designed by 
war fighters and aligns functional contributions to mis-
sions they support. The budget, on the other hand, is 
designed by technocrats and aligns objects-of-expense 
into a program structure. Short of redesigning the for-
mat of the budget, budget analysts are unable to process 
the performance information. For now, the broader De-
partment of the Navy budget is formulated in the Penta-
gon, away from the surface force, by analysts and bud-
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geters who do not and cannot process the detailed in-
formation contained in the performance management 
system. Program analysts who determine desired future 
budget levels and types of activities take a more strateg-
ic view of the SWE than managers who operate the 
fleet. If program analysts foresee a future different from 
the past then even optimal data provided by the fleet 
may not help determine future budgeting requirements. 
If budgeters weigh the need for submarines and aircraft 
against the need for surface ships, no common basis for 
comparison exists. When weighing whether cruise mis-
siles from a surface ship or smart bombs from an Air 
Force plane should perform a strike mission, the per-
formance management system does not help.  
 
Further confounding this organizational separation 
is the fact that many of the SWE’s assets serve multiple 
purposes. A destroyer, for instance, can provide air de-
fense support, anti-submarine support, and can strike 
targets at long distances with cruise missiles. Program 
analysts aligned by mission areas will incorporate the 
destroyer in their plans. A cost accounting system could 
assign a percentage of the ship’s cost to each mission 
area, but one cannot budget for a fractional ship. All the 
resources for that ship are necessarily assigned to one of 
those mission areas, overstating its cost and understat-
ing the cost of other areas.  
 
The combatant commanders who employ the ships 
in pursuit of national security objectives are also orga-
nizationally distinct from the budget process. By design, 
the operational commander’s attention is devoted to 
current operations in a theater while the navy staff in the 
Pentagon devotes its attention to building and support-
ing the navy. Those who can best assess the value of the 
military asset have no voice in the budget process. As 
Smith (2007) suggests, it may be preferable to value 





Finally, as Joyce (2003) reminds us, the best per-
formance management system cannot drive budgets. In 
the case of the SWE, the system (and the information it 
contains) is conceptually and organizationally distinct 
from the responsibility and accountability for determin-
ing the budget. The SWE has not built a bridge between 
the performance management system and the budgeting 
system. Given Schick’s (2007, p. 16) belief that 
“[p]ublic organizations would do well to deploy per-
formance budgeting as an analytic tool because few 
have the capacity to ground budget decisions on it,” we 
recommend SWE leaders think less about how to de-
termine budgets through their system and more about 
how to use performance information to influence budg-
ets. It may not be possible to answer, “how much fleet 
readiness does a certain amount of funding provide?” 
but it is possible to quantify the impact of incremental 
adjustments to budgets. Joyce (2003) suggests that per-
formance information should inform budgeting. Navy 
leaders who are frustrated that budgeting is not easier or 
more automatic should accept that easier and automatic 
are not reasonable expectations. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 
 
This study suggests that organizations implement 
performance management and performance budgeting 
systems for different reasons, and the form taken by the 
systems should match desired outcomes from the use of 
the systems. Managers and leaders should construct 
proper measures and align management incentives with 
desired outcomes and behavior; otherwise, individual 
parts of the organization will sub optimize. This re-
search confirms that trying to do too much with a given 
system results in inappropriate use of data, misma-
nagement of resources or misalignments of actions. It 
confirms that a desire for a single measure of perfor-
mance or effectiveness is, to use Hatry’s language, “fa-
shionable but should be looked at with considerable 
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skepticism” (2002, p. 352). And it confirms that preci-
sion does not equal accuracy. Managers of hard-to-
define outcomes and complex production functions 
should be content with generating a set of measures that 
captures the complexity of the issues. 
 
The research also confirms that those in an organi-
zation who evaluate and act on performance measures 
operate separately from those who allocate resources. 
Budget analysts and program evaluators employ differ-
ent analytical frameworks, and the budget process and 
evaluation process operate on different perceptions of 
time. Thus, using good data to inform the budget 
process may be the best leaders can hope to achieve 
from their performance management system. 
 
Finally, an organization’s managers must recognize 
that policymakers make different types of decisions 
from their own, and need different information. This 
study illustrates the usefulness of performance informa-
tion to an organization’s managers and the frustrations 
they experience trying to use that information to influ-
ence policy and funding. In recognition of these points, 
the SURFOR appointed a civilian deputy to the admiral 
to influence policymakers and other SWE organiza-
tions; however, it is too early to tell whether a “bridge 
maker” can help improve use of performance data in 
budgeting. Future studies should assess the effective-
ness of such a “bridging” mechanism from performance 
to budgets. 
 
In sum, this study provides some diagnosis of and 
suggestions for better using performance management 
systems to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public sector organizations and provides evidence of the 
challenges faced when attempting to use that informa-
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